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APRIL 1967 DOCUMENT -- S-2205/AP-4

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1. Effects on Military Targets

a. Reference paragraph 1, page 7, which states "Attacks against the highway system increased and a greater amount of damage was inflicted against bridges, bridge approaches, fords, ferries, and causeways".

AFNIN COMMENT: This damage should be quantified in a table similar to that used to reflect armed reconnaissance strike results in the DIA Intelligence Bulletin.

b. Reference paragraph 10, page 11, which states "The cumulative effects of the air strikes in North Vietnam have ... limited North Vietnam's capability for sustained large scale conventional operations against South Vietnam ... still retain the capability to support activities in South Vietnam and Laos at present or increased combat levels and force structures".

AFNIN COMMENT: This statement should be modified to include quantification of "Combat Levels" based on the estimated GOB and supporting logistic requirements. This subject area should be expanded and become the major portion of this report since it is this area of the report which reflects on the success of the bombings in terms of declared goal achievement.

2. Table 360, Tab A, is not referred to or explained in the analysis; it appears to reflect incomplete quantifying data; it does not reflect all general categories of NVN fixed targets; and is subject to possible misunderstanding.

a. The table only reflects strike data on a small percentage of the NVN target base, i.e., generally JCS targets. Additionally, the problem is compounded when the "National Capacity" sub-column reflects incomplete facility totals. Examples of this problem are:

(1) The table reflects a total of 23 airfields in NVN while the DIA AIT Printout, ICOD, 21 March 1967, reflects 33. Since the "JCS Targeted" sub-column reflects only JCS targets, the important jet airfield at Hoa Lac is not included nor will it ever appear as a "target struck".

(2) The table reflects 134 SAM sites; the current DIA SAGMOP reflects 165 sites capable of accepting SAM equipment. In the "Targets Struck" column, this category and the ferry category are the only two which reflect non-JCS fixed target strikes.

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(3) The "Targets" columns reflect a total of 1529 bridges in NVN with 61 targeted. The "Targets Struck" column reflects 50. This implies that only 61 of the total are considered important and of these, only 50 have been attacked.

b. In order to alleviate these problems, AFNIN recommends the following columnar modifications:

(1) Fixed Targets: include all categories of fixed targets to include chemical plants.

(2) Targets: the "National Capacity" sub-column should reflect the total number of facilities in the accepted target data base as well as the national capacity.

(3) An additional column, similar to "JCS Targeted", should be added to reflect the number of non-JCS targets and percentage of national capacity represented by these facilities.

(4) Targets Struck: modify to include the numbers of non-JCS fixed targets which have been struck.

(5) No. Attacks, Strike Sorties, and % of National Capacity: modify to include columns for both JCS targets and non-JCS targets.

c. Another deficiency of the table is the reflection of misleading strike results for armed recon attacks. The table reflects total armed recon sorties but limits results to fleeting targets. Although the footnote for this portion of the table makes reference to fixed target attacks, possible misunderstanding could be obviated by titling these data: Results of Armed Recon Strikes Against Fleeting Targets.

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